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Abstract—Fingerprint-based biometric systems have experi-
enced a large development in the last years. Despite their many
advantages, they are still vulnerable to presentation attacks
(PAs). Therefore, the task of determining whether a sample
stems from a live subject (i.e., bona fide) or from an artificial
replica is a mandatory issue which has received a lot of attention
recently. Nowadays, when the materials for the fabrication of the
Presentation Attack Instruments (PAIs) have been used to train
the PA Detection (PAD) methods, the PAIs can be successfully
identified. However, current PAD methods still face difficulties
detecting PAIs built from unknown materials or captured using
other sensors. Based on that fact, we propose a new PAD tech-
nique based on three image representation approaches combining
local and global information of the fingerprint. By transforming
these representations into a common feature space, we can
correctly discriminate bona fide from attack presentations in
the aforementioned scenarios. The experimental evaluation of
our proposal over the LivDet 2011 to 2015 databases, yielded
error rates outperforming the top state-of-the-art results by
up to 50% in the most challenging scenarios. In addition, the
best configuration achieved the best results in the LivDet 2019
competition (overall accuracy of 96.17%).
Index Terms—Presentation attack detection, local features
encoding, visual vocabulary, probabilistic visual vocabulary.
I. INTRODUCTION
Biometric recognition is based on the use of distinctive
anatomical and behavioural characteristics to automatically
recognise a subject [1]. Among other biometric characteristics,
fingerprints offer a high recognition accuracy and at the same
time enjoy a high popular acceptance. Despite these and
other advantages, fingerprint-based recognition systems can
be circumvented by launching Presentation Attacks (PAs), in
which an artificial fingerprint, denoted as Presentation Attack
Instrument (PAI) is presented to a sensor [2], [3], [4], [5].
The threat posed by PAIs is not reduced to an academic
issue. In 2002, Matsumoto et al. [4], [6] analysed the vul-
nerabilities of eleven commercial fingerprint-based biometric
systems to gummy fingerprints. The experimental evaluation
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TABLE I: Summary of the best state-of-the-art results on
different scenarios.
CNN Known-env Cross-sensor Cross-DB
MobileNet-v1 [13] 0.97% 14.59% 17.91%
Inception-v3 [12] 1.39% 16.60% 18.90%
Deep Triple Embedding [15] 3.33% 25.25% 15.20%
VGG [14] 4.61% 19.80% 30.70%
showed that 68% to 100% of the PAIs built with cooperative
methods were accepted as bona fide presentations (i.e., genuine
or live fingers). In 2009, Japan reported the use of presentation
attacks in one of its airports, and in 2013, a Brazilian doctor
used artificial silicone fingerprints to tamper a biometric
attendance system at the Sao Paulo hospital [7].
In order to tackle those severe security issues, the devel-
opment of Presentation Attack Detection (PAD) techniques,
which automatically detect PAIs presented to the biometric
capture device, is a mandatory task, which has attracted a
lot of attention within the biometric research community
not only for fingerprint systems [8], [9], but also for other
characteristics such as face [10] or iris [11]. These PAD meth-
ods can be widely classified as hardware- or software-based
approaches. Whereas the former require dedicated, and mostly
expensive, specific hardware, software-based approaches focus
on dynamic or static characteristics extracted from the same
biometric samples used for recognition purposes. Therefore,
software-based methods are less expensive, and will be the
focus of this article.
The newest fingerprint PAD techniques based on deep
learning and textural features have shown to be a powerful tool
to detect most PAIs [12], [13], [14], [15]. However, they share
a common limitation: they depend both on i) the material used
for fabricating the PAIs, and ii) the sensor used for acquiring
the fingerprint samples. More specifically, their error rates are
multiplied five to 18 times when either the PAIs’ materials or
the sensors utilised are not known a priori (see Table I).
To address the issue of generalisation to unknown factors,
we analyse the combination of local features (i.e., Scale-
Invariant Feature Transform, SIFT [16]) with three different
general purpose feature encoding approaches, which have
shown remarkable results in object classification tasks [17],
[18], [19]: i) Bag of Words (BoW), ii) Vector of Locally
Aggregated Descriptors (Vlad), and iii) Fisher Vector (FV).
The local descriptors, computed over the image gradient, allow
capturing different artefacts produced by materials used for
building the PAIs. Then, the afforementioned encoding ap-
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2proaches assign each local descriptor (i.e., SIFT) to the closest
entry in a visual vocabulary [20]. This visual vocabulary
defines a common feature space, thereby allowing a better
generalisation to unknown attacks or capture devices.
In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed meth-
ods and to allow the reproducibility of the results, we conduct a
thorough experimental evaluation on the LivDet 2011, LivDet
2013, and LivDet 2015 databases. The performance is reported
in compliance with the ISO/IEC 30107 international standard
on PAD evaluation [5], thereby allowing a rigorous analysis
of the results. The evaluation shows the capacity of the new
method to be used in high security applications: for a high
security operating point with an Attack Presentation Classi-
fication Error Rate (APCER) of 1%, an average Bona Fide
Presentation Classification Error Rate (BPCER) of 0.25%,
0.38% and 7.11% was achieved, respectively, on the three
databases, thereby outperforming the state-of-the-art. In addi-
tion, we would like to highlight that the proposed method took
part in the Fingerprint Liveness Detection Competition 2019,
achieving the best detection performance with an average
accuracy of 96.17% [21].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: related
works are summarised in Sect. II. In Sect. III, we describe
the proposed PAD methods. The experimental evaluation is
presented in Sect. IV. Finally, conclusions and future work
directions are presented in Sect. V.
II. RELATED WORK
As we mentioned in Sect. I, we focus on static software-
based fingerprint PAD methods, since they are the most time
and cost efficient. In particular, we review those methods
based on either deep learning or addressing scenarios with
unknown factors. For more details on other methods, the reader
is referred to [8], [9], [22].
In this context, it has been observed that some textural
properties including the morphology, smoothness, and ridge-
valley structure may be different between attack and bona
fide presentations, and can thus be used to discriminate them.
Building upon this idea, several texture-based PAD methods
have been proposed in the literature [23], [24]. More recently,
new methods based on deep learning approaches have signifi-
cantly outperformed any earlier PAD techniques. For instance,
Nogueira et al. [14] benchmarked three classic Convolutional
Neural Networks (CNN). One of their proposals achieved the
best results in the LivDet 2015 competition, with an overall
accuracy of 95.5%. In spite of those promising results, the
main limitation of these methods is that they learn features
from a whole image with a fixed size. In many cases, also
within the LivDet databases, the Region of Interest (ROI)
covers only a small area of the whole image (e.g., 19% for
some subsets of LivDet 2011), thus not being large enough
to allow an efficient PA detection. This is highlighted by the
results achieved on the LivDet 2011 - Italdata dataset, where
the ACER increased up to 9.2%.
To address the small ROI issue, Pala and Bhanu [15]
proposed training a triple convolutional network on one fixed
size and randomly extracted patch per image. In spite of the
obtained improvement with respect to the previous whole-
image-based approach [14], in the random patch extraction
process several patches extracted from Italdata 2011 could
stem from the background region of the image, thereby
resulting in a still high ACER of 5.1%.
More recently, and based on the fact that PAIs produce
spurious minutiae on a fingerprint image, Chugh et al. [12],
[13] proposed a deep learning framework for independently
classifying local patches around minutiae extracted from a
fingerprint image. The final bona fide vs PA decision was
defined as the average between PAD scores of the local
patches. This approach additionally allows finding PA regions
inside a sample, even if the PAI only covers part of the
underlying fingerprint. The method achieves the lowest ACER
values reported so far over the LivDet databases (see Table I,
left column). However, despite the excellent results reported
in the known environment (i.e., known attacks and known
sensors), an evaluation on more challenging scenarios (i.e.,
unknown sensors and/or PAI fabrication materials) shows an
increase in the error rates (see Table I).
Finally, Park et al. propose in [25] an efficient CNN based
on the fire module of the SqueezeNet to optimise the hardware
and time requirements. Evaluated over the LivDet 2011 to
2015, the CNN outperforms for some datasets the work
presented in [13], at the same time reducing over 6 times the
execution time. It should be though noted that the performance
of this PAD method under more challenging scenarios with
unknown attacks or sensors remains unknown.
To sum up, the main drawback of the aforementioned
methods is their high dependency both on the PAI fabrication
materials and the capture device. To tackle these issues,
several approaches based on handcrafted features have been
followed. On the one hand, Rattani et al. proposed in [26] an
automatic adaptation of Weibull-calibrated support vector ma-
chines (SVMs). Over the LivDet 2011 database, the obtained
equal error rates (EERs) oscillated between 20 and 30% for
the best configuration in the presence of unknown PAI species.
On the other hand, Ding and Ross analysed an ensemble of
one-class SVMs trained only on bona fide data in [27], which
lowered the error rates to 10-22% over the same dataset.
More recently, in an extension of [13], Chugh and Jain
identified in [28] a subset of six out of 12 PAI species which
can yield detection rates similar to known attacks scenarios.
That is, training the SpoofBuster with only those six PAI
species and testing on all 12 species results in an APCER
= 10.24% at BPCER = 0.2%, very close to the APCER =
9.03% when all PAI species are used for training. In spite of
these impressive results, it should be noted that the selection
of the training PAI plays a crucial role in this study.
This dependecy is highlighted again by Engelsma and
Jain in [29], where multiple generative adversarial networks
(GANs) are trained on bona fide images acquired with the
RaspiReader sensor. From the same 12 different PAI species,
six are used for training and six for testing. In a benchmark
with the method proposed in [27], the GANs outperform
the SVMs. However, the average APCERs achieved for a
BPCER = 0.2% vary from 31.42% to 68.98%, depending
on the training set used. This shows again a high sensitivity
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Fig. 1: PAD approach overview. First, dense-SIFT descriptors are computed at different scales. Then this features are encoded
using a previously learned visual vocabulary by means of three different approaches: a) BoW, b) FV, and c) Vlad. Afterwards,
the fingerprint descriptor is classified using a linear SVM. The final decision is made by a weighted sum rule-based fusion.
to different training datasets. In addition, this approach is
not directly comparable to those based on conventional (e.g.,
Crossmatch or Greenbit) sensors, since a specific hardware,
namely the RaspiReader, was used to acquire the samples.
Finally, Gajawada et al. try to tackle this dependency
on the PAI species contained in the training set from a
different perspective in [30]. They propose a so-called deep
learning based “Universal Material Translator” (UMT). Given
a reduced number (e.g., five) of samples from a new PAI
species, the UMT extracts their main appearance features to
embed them into a database of bona fide samples, in order
to generate synthetic samples of the new PAI species. Those
synthetic samples can be then utilised to train any CNN.
Over the LivDet 2015 database, the authors showed how the
proposed approach can improve up to 17% the detection rates,
achieving a remarkable 21.96% APCER for a BPCER = 0.1%.
However, it should be noted that this approach does require
some samples (i.e., five) of the analysed unknown PAI species.
In this context, our method tackles the issue of detection
performance degradation in the presence of unknown factors
(i.e., attacks, sensors, or databases) by transforming the lo-
cal descriptors extracted from the fingerprint samples into a
common feature space. This allows for better generalisation
capabilities to more challenging scenarios, not needing any
samples of the unknown attacks for training.
III. PROPOSED METHOD
Fig. 1 shows an overview of the proposed PAD approach,
based on the fusion of three different feature encoding ap-
proachs. In the first common processing step, the Pyramid
Histogram of Visual Words (PHOW) [31] algorithm is used
to extract local features: the so-called dense Scale-Invariant
Feature Transform (dense-SIFT) descriptors (Sect. III-A). Sub-
sequently, three encoding methods are applied to bring the
aforementioned local descriptors into a common feature space:
i) Bag-of-Words (BoW) [17] (Sect. III-B1), ii) Fisher Vector
(FV) [20] (Sect. III-B2), and iii) Vector Locally Aggregated
Descriptors (Vlad) [32] (Sect. III-B3). Afterwards, each set of
encoded features is classified using a different Support Vector
Machine (SVM) (Sect. III-C). The final bona fide (BP) vs
presentation attack (PA) decision for the sample at hand is
defined as a weighted score level fusion of the three SVMs
(Sect. III-D).
A. Local Features Extraction: dense-SIFT Descriptors
As local feature descriptors we have chosen the dense-SIFT
approach, computed over the image gradient, since they can
capture lower coherence areas introduced by the coarseness of
different PAI fabrication materials. In particular, the Pyramid
Histogram Of visual Words (PHOW) approach proposed by
[31] computes SIFT descriptors densely at fixed points on
a regular grid with uniform spacing S (e.g., 5 pixels), as
summarised in Fig. 2 (left). For each point in the grid, the
dense-SIFT descriptor computes the gradient vector for each
pixel in the feature point’s neighbourhood (Fig. 2, top right),
taking into account 8 different directions. Subsequently, a
normalized 8-bin histogram of gradient directions (Fig. 2,
bottom right) is built over 4×4 sample regions. In addition, in
order to account for the scale variation between fingerprints,
these dense-SIFT descriptors are computed over four circular
patches or windows with different scales σ = {5, 7, 10, 12}.
Therefore, each point in the grid is represented by four SIFT
descriptors (i.e., one per σ) comprising a total number of 128
features (i.e., 4× 4 8-bin histograms).
It should be noted that windows with different scales allow
extracting local information of fingerprints at different resolu-
tion levels, thereby detecting variable-size artefacts produced
in the fabrication of PAIs. In addition, near-uniform local
patches do not yield stable keypoints or descriptors. Therefore,
we have used a fixed threshold δ on the average norm of the
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Fig. 2: dense-SIFT descriptors computed on fixed points on
a regular grid, striding with a uniform spacing S and using
several scales σ.
local gradient in order to remove local descriptors from low
contrast regions (i.e., regions with an average norm value close
to zero).
B. Local Feature Encoding
In the second stage of the PAD algorithm, three different
feature encoding approaches for the dense-SIFT descriptors
are analysed.
1) Bag of Words (BoW): Bag-of-Words (BoW) based
techniques were first developed for text categorization tasks,
in which a text document is assigned to one or more categories
based on its content [33]. For this purpose, BoW represents
the text document by a sparse histogram of word occurrence
based on a visual vocabulary. Following this same idea, Csurka
et al. [17] adopted and transformed this technique to represent
local features from an image in terms of the so-called visual
words. Our method builds upon this last approach.
As first proposed in [34], the BoW representation first
computes the visual vocabulary as a codebook with K different
centroids or visual words (see Fig. 1, top) with k-means
clustering. Then, the BoW representation is defined as the
histogram of the number of image descriptors assigned to each
visual word. Its computation is summarised in Fig. 3. First,
an m-level pyramid of spatial histograms is used in order to
incorporate spatial relationships between patches. To do that,
the fingerprint image is partitioned into increasingly fine sub-
regions, and the dense-SIFT descriptors inside each sub-region
are assigned to the closest centroid among the K visual words,
using a fast version of k-means clustering [35]. Subsequently,
the histograms inside each sub-region are computed and
stacked into a single and final feature vector.
2) Fisher Vector (FV): BoW approaches encode local
features using a hard assignment, in which a local descriptor
is only assigned to one visual word based on a similarity
function. In contrast, the Fisher Vector (FV) method derives
a kernel from a generative model of the data (e.g., Gaussian
Mixture Model, GMM), and describes how the set of local
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Fig. 3: Example of pyramid of spatial histograms. a) Quan-
tized features using k-means. b) 3-level pyramid of spatial
histograms built from quantized features.
descriptors deviate from an average distribution of the de-
scriptors [20]. The aforementioned model can be understood
as a probabilistic visual vocabulary, which thereby allows a
soft assignment. Thus, the FV paradigm encodes not only the
number of descriptors assigned to each region, but also their
position in terms of their deviation with respect to the pre-
defined model.
As proposed in [36], we train a GMM model with di-
agonal covariances from decorrelated dense-SIFT descriptors
extracted on the previous step (see the second row in Fig. 1).
In general, the K-components of the GMM are represented by
the mixture weights (wk), Gaussian means (µk) and covariance
matrix (σk), with k = 1, . . . ,K. This leads to an image
representation which captures the average statistics first-order
and second-order differences between the local features and
each of the GMM centres [37]:
φ1k =
1
N
√
wk
N∑
i=1
αi(k)
(
xi − µk
σk
)
, (1)
φ2k =
1
N
√
2wk
N∑
i=1
αi(k)
(
(xi − µk)2
σ2k
− 1
)
, (2)
where αi(k) is the soft assignment weights of the i-th feature
xi to the k-th Gaussian. It is important to highlight that wk, µk
and σk are computed during the training stage. Finally, the FV
representation that defines a fingerprint image is obtained by
stacking the differences: φ =
[
φ11, φ
2
1, · · · , φ1K , φ2K
]
.
With the aim of clustering the extracted local features with
GMM diagonal covariance matrices, the dense-SIFT features
are decorrelated using PCA [32]. In our approach, the dense-
SIFT descriptor dimension was reduced from 128 to d = 64
components, hence resulting the final FV representation in a
2Kd = 128·K size vector, where K is the number of Gaussian
components in the GMM and d is the dimension of a dense-
SIFT descriptor.
5TABLE II: PAI fabrication materials used in each dataset of the LivDet 2011 - 2015 databases, where U denotes unknown
material in the test set.
.
DB Dataset Gelatine Latex PlayDoh Silicone Wood glue Ecoflex Body Double Modasil Liquid ecoflex RTV OOMOO Gelatine 2
20
11
Biometrika X X X X X
Digital P. X X X X X
Italdata X X X X X
Sagem X X X X X
20
13
Biometrika X X X X X
Italdata X X X X X
Crossmatch X X X X
Swipe X X X X
20
15
GreenBit X X X X X(U) X(U)
Digital P. X X X X X(U) X(U)
Hi Scan X X X X X(U) X(U)
Crossmatch X X X X(U) X(U)
3) Vector Locally Aggregated Descriptors (Vlad): In order
to reduce the high-dimension image representation proposed
by the FV and BoW approaches, gaining in efficiency and
memory usage, we have finally studied the Vector Locally
Aggregated Descriptors (Vlad) methodology [32] (see Fig. 1,
third row). This is a simplified non-probabilistic version of
FV, which models the data distribution from the accumulative
distances between a visual word xi and its closest center c in
the visual vocabulary. Therefore, as in the BoW approach, a
visual vocabulary needs to be computed in the first step with
the k-means algorithm.
More specifically, a d-dimensional local feature descriptor
x (i.e., dense-SIFT descriptor) can be represented by a Vlad
descriptor vx of size Kd as follows:
vx =
d∑
j=1
 ∑
x:NN(x)=ci
xj − ci,j
 , (3)
where xj and ci,j denote the j-th component of x, and its
corresponding closest visual word ci. In our method, vx is
subsequently L2-normalised in order to further improve the
classification accuracy.
Finally, it is important to highlight that Vlad also uses PCA
for decorrelating training data.
C. Classification
In order to classify the final encoded representations, sepa-
rate linear SVMs have been used for each encoding approach.
In order to find the optimal hyperplane separating the bona
fide from the attack presentations, the optimisation algorithm
bounds the loss from below. Therefore, we have trained two
complementary SVMs as follows:
• The first SVM labels the bona fide samples as +1
and the presentation attacks as -1, thereby yielding the
corresponding Wbf (weights) and bbf (bias) classifier
parameters.
• The second SVM labels the bona fide samples as -1
and the presentation attacks as +1, thereby yielding the
corresponding Wpa and bpa classifier parameters.
Subsequently, given an encoded feature descriptor x, two
different scores are computed, which estimate both the class
of the sample (i.e., the score sign) and the confidence of such
decision (i.e., the absolute value of the score is the distance
to the hyperplane):
sbf =W
′
bf · x+ bbf (4)
spa =W
′
pa · x+ bpa (5)
The final score is then computed to minimise the distance
to the corresponding hyperplane, thereby choosing the most
reliable decision for the given vector:
s =
{
sbf if abs (sbf ) < abs (spa)
spa otherwise
(6)
D. Fused Approach (FPAD)
Given three different individual PAD scores,
sFV, sVlad, sBoW, output by the corresponding SVM,
we define the final fused score sfusion as follows:
sfusion = α · sFV + β · sVlad + (1− α− β) · sBoW (7)
where α+ β ≤ 1.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate and benchmark the detection
performance of each fingerprint encoding scheme described
in Sect. III. Specifically, three goals were taken into account
for the experimental protocol design: i) analyse the impact of
the key parameter K (vocabulary size) on the detection per-
formance of the three proposed PAD schemes, ii) benchmark
the detection performance of our proposals against the top
state-of-the-art approaches, and iii) study the computational
performance of the three fingerprint encoding schemes.
A. Experimental Protocol
The proposed PAD methods were implemented in C++
using the open-source VLFeat library1. All the experiments
were conducted on an Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2670 v2
processor at 2.50 GHz, 378GB RAM.
1) Databases: The experiments were conducted on the
well-established benchmarks from LivDet 2011 [38], LivDet
2013 [39] and LivDet 2015 [40]. A summary of the PAI
fabrications materials is included in Table II.
1http://www.vlfeat.org/
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0.00 0.00
0.10 0.10
0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00
Biometrika
Italdata
Digital P.
0.20
0.80
0.00
0.00
BPCER10 BPCER20 BPCER100
Avg. 0.03 0.03 0.25
0.00 0.10
0.00 0.00
0.00 0.10
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Avg. 0.94 2.12 7.11
Digital P.
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DET curves for the fusion-based PAD proposal on the known-scenario
Fig. 4: Performance evaluation of fused FPAD method under the known-material and known-sensor scenario.
TABLE III: Benchmark in terms of the ACER with the state-of-the-art. The best results are highlighted in bold.
DB Dataset [14] [15] [12] [25] FSB [13] FV Vlad BoW FPAD
L
iv
D
et
20
11 Biometrika 5.20 5.15 2.60 1.10 1.24 3.45 3.90 8.15 0.20 (α = 0.40, β = 0.40)
Digital P. 3.20 1.85 2.70 1.10 1.61 0.20 0.10 3.15 0.00 (α = 0.00, β = 0.50)
Italdata 8.00 5.10 3.25 4.75 2.45 3.10 6.50 11.15 0.80 (α = 0.50, β = 0.10)
Sagem 1.70 1.23 1.80 1.56 1.39 1.75 1.00 4.35 0.10 (α = 0.00, β = 0.60)
Avg. 4.52 3.33 2.59 3.12 1.67 2.13 2.88 6.70 0.28
L
iv
D
et
20
13 Biometrika 1.80 0.65 0.60 0.35 0.20 1.30 1.70 4.95 0.50 (α = 0.10, β = 0.70)
Italdata 0.40 0.50 0.40 0.40 0.30 0.60 0.70 12.25 0.10 (α = 0.20, β = 0.50)
Crossmatch 3.40 - - - - 3.70 4.30 5.50 0.80 (α = 0.60, β = 0.00)
Swipe 3.70 0.66 - - - 1.90 4.00 6.35 0.30 (α = 0.50, β = 0.10)
Avg. 2.33 - - - - 1.88 2.68 7.26 0.43
L
iv
D
et
20
15 GreenBit 4.60 - 2.00 0.35 0.68 1.30 2.40 7.05 1.20 (α = 0.90, β = 0.00)
Digital P. 5.64 - 1.76 1.09 1.12 4.75 5.20 14.10 4.60 (α = 0.80, β = 0.20)
Hi Scan 6.28 - 1.08 3.40 1.48 3.20 4.20 11.15 3.20 (α = 1.00, β = 0.00)
Crossmatch 1.90 - 0.81 0.20 0.64 3.56 4.85 10.38 2.28 (α = 0.90, β = 0.10)
Avg. 4.61 - 1.39 1.26 0.97 3.20 4.16 10.67 2.82
2) Evaluation Protocol and Metrics: To reach the afore-
mentioned objectives, the experimental evaluation considers
three different scenarios: i) known-material and known-sensor,
ii) known-sensor and unknown-material, and iii) unknown-
sensor and cross-database.
The detection performance is evaluated in compliance with
the ISO/IEC IS 30107 [5]: we report the Attack Presenta-
tion Classification Error Rate (APCER), which refers to the
percentage of misclassified presentation attacks for a fixed
threshold, and the Bona Fide Presentation Classification Error
Rate (BPCER), which indicates the percentage of misclassified
bona fide presentations. We also include the Detection Error
Trade-Off (DET) curves between both error rates, as well
as the BPCER for a fixed APCER of 10% (BPCER10), 5%
(BPCER20) and 1% (BPCER100).
Then, in order to establish a fair benchmark with the existing
literature, we report the ACER as the average of the APCER
and the BPCER for a fixed detection threshold δ.
B. Experimental Results
1) Known-Material and Known-Sensor Scenario: First,
we optimise the algorithms’ detection performances in terms
of the main key parameter: the visual vocabulary size K. To
that end, we focus on the known scenario, in order to avoid
a bias due to other variables. We test the following range of
values: K = {256, 512, 1024, 2048}, since K > 2048 would
yield too long feature vectors, not usable for real-time applica-
tions. We found that the best K value on average is K = 1024
(for more details, the reader is referred to the appendix), and
optimised the fusion parameters (see Sect. III-D) for this value
in terms of the D-EER.
Fig. 4 shows the DET curves for the FPAD approach over
all sensors for K = 1024. As it can be observed, for low
APCER values of 1% (i.e., high security thresholds), the FPAD
achieves a remarkable average BPCER100 = 0.25% (vs4˙.05%
in [13]) for LivDet 2011 and 0.38% for LivDet 2013. More in
detail, for LivDet 2011, the Digital Persona and Sagem sensors
report a BPCER = 0% for any APCER ≥ 0.2%. Regarding
the LivDet 2013 database, the results are similar and for all
sensors, and we observe a BPCER = 0% for any APCER ≥
10%. In contrast, the FPAD suffers a detection performance
decrease, with error rates multiplied by up to 42 times. More
specifically, it shows a BPCER10 = 0.94%, BPCER20 = 2.12%
and BPCER100 = 7.11%.
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Fig. 5: Performance evaluation over the unknown material scenarios.
In Table VIa, we benchmark our results with the state-
of-the-art in terms of the ACER. The lowest value on each
row is highlighted in bold. As it can be observed, even if
the individual feature encoding approaches do not outperform
the FSB, the fused FPAD approach yields the lowest average
ACER for both LivDet 2011 (0.28% vs1˙.67%) and LivDet
2013 (0.43%). On the other hand, the FSB achieves the best
performance over LivDet 2015 (0.97% vs2˙.82%). Nonetheless,
it should be noted that the main goal of the present work is
not only to achieve the best performance at a single operating
point (i.e., the ACER is measured for δ = 0.5) but overall
for different applications requiring either a low BPCER (i.e.,
high convenience) or low APCER (i.e., high security), and also
under more challenging and realistic conditions (i.e., unknown
sensors or PAI species).
2) Known-Sensor and Unknown-Material Scenario: In
this scenario, both training and test samples were acquired
by the same sensor, while presentation attacks in the test
set were acquired from unknown PAI species. We analyse
in detail the best performing single approach (FV) and the
FPAD method. For the latter, we select the fixed thresholds
obtained for the known-scenario (see α, β values in Table I),
and denote this configuration as “fixed thresholds”. In addition,
we also evaluate its performance on the best α, β threshold
combination (hereafter referred to as “optimised thresholds”).
The corresponding DET curves are reported in Fig. 5.
Regarding the LivDet 2015 protocol, we can observe a
similar behaviour between the FV encoding and the fused
FPAD algorithm for fixed thresholds in Fig. 5a. In particular,
the BPCER10 and BPCER20 are slightly higher for the
individual FV encoding (around 1.6-7% and 3.5-9%), but for
high security thresholds, the FPAD achieves lower error rates
(BPCER 14.3% vs. 14.4%). Also, the DET curves for Greenbit
and Crossmatch are very close, whereas the performance
for HI Scan and Digital Persona decreases. In contrast, the
optimised thresholds FPAD achieves the best performance
8TABLE IV: ACER evaluated on the unknown-materials protocol proposed by [14].
PAI species FV Vlad BoW FPAD FSB [13]Dataset Train Test Fx thr. Op thr.
Bio11 EcoFlex, Gelatine, Latex Silgum, Woodglue 6.33 10.05 15.05 4.78 2.05 4.60
Bio13 Modasil, Woodglue EcoFlex, Gelatine, Latex 1.00 2.82 5.50 1.50 0.00 1.30
Ita11 EcoFlex, Gelatine, Latex Silgum, Woodglue, Other 4.50 16.50 21.83 3.60 2.00 5.20
Ita13 Modasil, Woodglue EcoFlex, Gelatine, Latex 0.50 1.17 4.63 0.50 0.00 0.60
Avg. 3.08 7.64 11.75 2.61 1.01 2.93
for Hi Scan, only showing a lower performance for Digital
Persona. And in all cases, the detection rates are higher,
yielding a low BPCER of 7%. Regarding the state-of-the-art,
[30] achieves an average APCER of 22% for a BPCER = 0.1%
for the Crossmatch dataset, and he FPAD approach achieves
an APCER under 20%, thus highlighting its soundness.
In the second set of experiments, we follow the unkown-
material protocol defined in [14]. In this case, Fig. 5b shows
one of the main strengths of FV encoding: under high security
scenarios, an average BPCER100 under 5% can be achieved.
In particular, for Italdata 2011 (BPCER100 = 6.20%) and
Italdata 2013 (BPCER100 = 0.0%) those values outperform
the ones reported by [13]. Regarding the fused algorithms, it
can be also observed that even the fixed thresholds configu-
ration achieves a BPCER100 comparable to FSB [13] (i.e.,
BPCER100 = 4.48% vs. 4.24%). In addition, the optimised
thresholds FPAD reports a BPCER100 = 1.85%, which is
twice smaller.
We finally compare in Table VIb the performance of our
methods and FSB [13] in terms of the ACER. We can observe
that the FV encoding outperforms the remaining algorithms
for three out of the four datasets. Moreover, for the fixed
and optimised thresholds, our FPAD pipeline achieves an
average ACER = 2.61% and ACER = 1.01% respectively,
which considerably outperforms the top state-of-the-art.
3) Unknown-Sensor and Cross-Database Scenarios: Fi-
nally, we evaluate the soundness of our proposals in scenarios
where different (i.e., unknown) sensors are used following
the unknown-sensor and cross-database scenarios proposed by
[14].
In the first set of experiments, training and test samples are
acquired using different sensors (i.e., sensor inter-operability
analysis). Fig. 6a shows the corresponding ISO-compliant
evaluation. As it may be observed, training over the Italdata
subset yields a better performance at all operating points than
training over Biometrika (grey vs orange, and blue vs yellow
cuves). Only low BPCERs ≤ 0.5% over the LivDet 2013 show
a different behaviour. Moreover, for a fixed APCER of 1%, the
FV encoding achieves BPCER100 of 26.80%, which reduces
almost by 50% the top state-of-the-art result (BPCER100 =
52.52%) [13]. In addition, our optimised thresholds FPAD
approach attains a BPCER = 0% for all APCERs over the
Italdata13 train set – we may thus conclude that the method
found the optimal common feature space from the Italdata
2013 training set to correctly classify the Biometrika 2013
samples.
Table VIc benchmarks all methods to FSB [13] in terms
of ACER. In general, and regardless of the particular train-
test combination, FV encoding is able to outperform both the
TABLE V: ACER evaluated on the unknown-sensor proto-
cols proposed by [14].
(a) Unknown-sensor protocol.
FV Vlad BoW FPAD FSB [13]Train - Test Fx thr. Op thr.
Bio11 - Ital11 19.10 19.30 32.92 23.50 16.80 25.35
Bio13 - Ital13 1.70 3.50 32.20 0.80 0.40 4.30
Ital11 - Bio11 9.60 15.20 32.25 11.40 9.10 25.21
Ital13 - Bio13 0.90 1.90 6.75 0.50 0.00 3.50
Avg. 7.83 9.98 26.04 9.05 6.58 14.59
(b) Cross-database protocol.
FV Vlad BoW FPAD FSB [13]Train - Test Fx thr. Op thr.
Bio11 - Bio13 6.80 15.70 28.80 25.20 6.80 7.60
Bio13 - Bio11 12.70 11.10 49.80 11.20 9.50 31.16
Ital11 - Ital13 5.60 8.70 47.75 11.70 5.10 6.70
Ital13 - Ital11 11.50 18.10 49.60 22.90 11.50 26.16
Avg. 9.15 13.40 43.99 17.75 8.23 17.91
other two encoding approaches and the results obtained in [13]
(i.e., average ACER = 7.83% for FV vs. 14.59% for FSB,
which implies a relative improvement of 48%). Moreover, the
FPAD also outperforms the FSB [13] for both the fixed and
the optimised thresholds by a relative improvement of 38%
and 55%, respectively.
In the second experiment, the performance is evaluated
over the change of data collection over the same sensor
(i.e., train and test over the same sensor, but acquired for
LivDet 2011 and LivDet 2013, respectively). We refer to
this protocol as cross-database scenario. In Fig. 6b we can
see different behaviours for each algorithm for the different
datasets. Whereas the Biometrika curves (orange and yellow)
are very close for the FV encoding, this is not the case for
the fused FPAD. This is due to the different generalisation
capabilities of the remaining encoding approaches (BoW and
Vlad), as it may be seen in Table VId. In particular, the ACER
achieved training over Biometrika 2011 are better than training
over Biometrika 2013 for BoW (28.8% vs. 15.70%), and vice
versa for Vlad (15/70% vs. 11.10%). In addition, the poor
performance of BoW also affects the fixed thresholds FPAD,
thereby yielding a poor BPCER100 of almost 60%. However,
the optimised thresholds FPAD can improve the error rates
yielded by FV, achieving an average BPCER100 of 26%.
Finally, coming back to the ACER-based benchmark with
FSB [13], we may observe that, on average, all the FV
approach (ACER = 9.15%), the fixed thresholds FPAD (ACER
= 17.75%) and the optimised thresholds FPAD (ACER =
8.23%) are able to outperform the FSB (ACER = 17.91%)
by up to a 55% relative improvement.
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Fig. 6: Performance evaluation over the unknown sensor scenarios proposed by [14].
4) Computational efficiency: In this last set of experi-
ments, we study the computational efficiency of the proposed
image encodings for different parameter configurations. For
this purpose, we select the LivDet 2015 database, which
contains the largest images. We found that the BoW encoding
requires 0.38 seconds, Vlad 1.58 seconds, and FV 2.11 sec-
onds. There is thus a trade-off between detection performance
and time efficiency. However, in all cases, the algorithms can
be utilised for real-time applications.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed a new PAD method based
on the combination of local dense-SIFT image descriptors and
three different feature encoding approaches (i.e., FV, Vlad,
and BoW). The experimental evaluation conducted over the
publicly available LivDet 2011, LivDet 2013 and LivDet 2015
databases assessed the performance of our proposals with
respect to the top state-of-the-art methods. The analysis of the
detection performance showed that the FV reached the best
individual detection accuracy for all databases. However, a
score-level fusion of the three encoding approaches (known
as FPAD) yielded an improved performance, significantly
outperforming the top state-of-the-art results in the analysed
scenarios, specially under the most challenging and realistic
scenarios, where both unknown materials and unknown sen-
sors are frequently employed. In addition, this fused approach
achieved the highest detection accuracy on the LivDet 2019
competition [21].
It should be also noted that the fixed thresholds config-
urations do not always outperform the FV encoding as a
standalone algorithm. This highlights the challenges faced
when unknown sensors or PAI species are contained in the
test set. However, a proper tuning of the thresholds yields a
very promising performance for the FPAD algorithm.
In more details, the ISO-compliant evaluation in terms of
BPCER and APCER showed one of the main strengths of
the FV encoding and the FPAD proposal: the low BPCERs
achieved even for very high security operating points (i.e.,
10
APCER ≤ 1%). Specifically, the FPAD technique yielded an
average BPCER100 of 25% on the unkown-sensor scenario,
and a BPCER100 of 26% to 28% on the cross-database
scenario, thereby outperforming the top state-of-the-art re-
sults [13] by up to a relative 50% to 60%, respectively.
Moreover, both methods proved to be suitable in the presence
of unknown PAI species, achieving a BPCER100 as low as
4.6% and 1%. In summary, the previous results indicate that
i) orientation histograms provided by the dense-SIFT method
correctly represent the lack of continuity in the ridge’s flow,
and hence the artefacts produced in the fabrication of PAIs,
and ii) FV as well as the fusion-based proposal in combination
with dense-SIFT descriptors found a new common feature
space, which allows successfully detecting both known and
unknown PAIs.
Finally, the computational efficiency evaluation showed that
BoW encoding attained efficiency results below 400 mil-
liseconds, while Vlad and FV encodings were above 1150
milliseconds. As future work lines, we will improve the
computational cost of the Vlad and FV encodings in order
to obtain the best trade-off between detection accuracy and
computational efficiency.
APPENDIX
ANALYSIS OF THE DETECTION PERFORMANCE FOR
DIFFERENT VOCABULARY SIZES
As it was mentioned in the article, the main parameter
shared by all feature encoding approaches is the vocabulary
size K. The larger K is, the higher number of visual words is,
and thus, the less the information loss during the quantisation
carried out to convert the local dense-SIFT descriptors into the
so-called common feature space. However, this also entails a
higher computational cost, and can eventually end up in over
fitting. Therefore, we analyse here in detail the impact of K
on the detection performance and the computational efficiency
of the PAD method for each scenario.
A. Known-Material and Known-Sensor Scenario
In the first place, we need to analyse the impact of K on the
performance of the three proposed schemes individually. We
do that under this all-known scenario in order to avoid a bias
due to other variables (i.e., unknown PAI species or sensors).
More specifically, we test the following range of values: K =
{256, 512, 1024, 2048}, since K > 2048 would yield too long
feature vectors, not usable for real-time applications.
The ACER values for each method and K are presented in
Table VIa, and graphically in Fig. 7a. As it can be observed,
most curves reach a minimum (i.e., lowest ACER, and thus,
best detection performance) for K = 1024. In some cases, the
ACER achieved for K = 2048 continues to decrease (e.g., the
BoW encoding for LivDet 2013), thus not reaching a minimum
over the selected range. However, as it was mentioned above,
such vocabulary sizes would imply a non real-time detection,
and will thus not be considered in the present study.
Now, focusing on the best K value on average, K = 1024,
we can highlight that FV encoding achieves on average, for
all sensors, an ACER of 2.13%, 1.88% and 3.31% on LivDet
2011, LivDet 2013 and LivDet 2015, respectively. On the other
hand, the best Vlad performance values are found at K = 1024
(i.e. 2.88% on LivDet 2011 and 2.68% on LivDet 2013) for all
databases with exception of the LivDet 2015 dataset, in which
the best accuracy is reached at K = 2048 (ACER = 4.16%).
Finally, the BoW encoding improves its detection performance
with K, thereby achieving its minimum ACER result at K =
2048.
B. Known-Sensor and Unknown-Material Scenario
In this scenario, both training and test samples were ac-
quired by the same sensor, while presentation attacks in the
test set were acquired from unknown PAI species.
In the first set of experiments, we select the LivDet 2015
database, since it already includes unknown PAI species for
testing. Fig. 7b shows, in terms of ACER, the impact of the
parameter key K on the performance of the proposed encoding
techniques. As it can be seen, the average performance (repre-
sented with a dashed red line) improves with increasing values
for K, achieving a minimum for K = 2048. More specifically,
the FV encoding yields the best ACER results, with an average
value of 3.31%.
We have also analysed the unknown materials protocols
for LivDet 2011 and 2013 proposed in [14]. The results are
presented in Table VIb. In this case, only the BoW encoding
reaches the best detection performance for K = 2048. On the
other hand, on average, the best results are yielded by K =
512 for FV, and K = 256 for Vlad.
Finally, it should also be highlighted that, for all three
datasets (i.e., LivDet 2011, 2013 and 2015), BoW shows a
higher variability range for different values of K. For instance,
ACER varies within 3.03 and 4.44 for FV, between 1.64 and
8.61 for Vlad, and between 9.28 and 16.60 for BoW for LivDet
2015. Therefore, BoW is much more sensitive to changes in
K.
C. Unknown-Sensor and Cross-Database Scenarios
Finally, in order to evaluate the soundness of our proposals
in scenarios where different (i.e., unknown) sensors are used,
we follow the unknown-sensor and cross-database scenarios
proposed by [14].
In the first set of experiments, training and test samples
are acquired using different sensors. Table VIc shows the
ACER for different values of K. As it can be observed, the
FV encoding achieves its better results at different values of
K, depending on the sensor used for training: whereas for
Italdata 2011 and 2013, the lowest ACER is achieved for K
= 512 (9.60% and 0.90%), for Biometrika it is obtained for
K = 2048 (18.50% and 1.20%). In general, and regardless
of the particular train-test combination, FV encoding is able
to outperform both the other two encoding approaches and
the results obtained in [13] (i.e., ACER = 7.83% for FV vs
14.59% for FSB [13], which implies a relative improvement
of 48%). These results indicate that FV encoding found a set
of common features in training images that allow a correct
detection of PAIs acquired with other sensors.
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Fig. 7: Performance evaluation in terms of ACER for all databases. The dashed red line shows the average trend for different
values of K.
In the second experiment, the performance is evaluated over
the change of data collection over the same sensor (i.e., train
and test over the same sensor, but acquired for LivDet 2011
and LivDet 2013, respectively). We refer to this protocol as
cross-database scenario, and Table VId shows the impact of K
on each proposed approach. As it can be observed, again the
FV encoding is able to outperform both the other encoding
approaches presented in this study and the top state-of-the-
art results. In particular, in three out of four cases, the best
peformance is achieved for K = 2048. Only fo Biometrika13
- Biometrika11 the best performance is reached for K = 512.
Under these last two scenarios, the range of variability of
BoW’s performance is comparable to FV and Vlad. However,
the ACER is multiplied by up to 4.8 times, thus making this
encoding not as suitable for PAD purposes as the other two.
In general, we have seen how different values of K can
impact the performance of the PAD method, and how, de-
pending on the scenario considered, different values yield the
best performance. However, an average value of K = 1024
always achieved either the best performance for FV and Vlad
or it is close to it. Therefore, we can conclude that, if no data
12
TABLE VI: ACER evaluated on the known scenario and on the protocols proposed by [14].
(a) Known sensors and materials.
FV encoding Vlad encoding BoW encoding
DB Dataset 256 512 1024 2048 256 512 1024 2048 256 512 1024 2048
L
iv
D
et
20
11 Biometrika 3.45 3.50 4.00 3.45 4.65 4.55 3.90 5.45 9.85 9.05 6.95 8.15
Digital P. 1.05 0.60 0.25 0.20 0.65 0.20 0.10 0.05 2.75 2.30 1.60 3.15
Italdata 6.00 3.95 3.45 3.10 7.60 5.80 6.50 6.15 26.95 21.80 19.25 11.15
Sagem 2.00 1.85 1.65 1.75 1.35 1.30 1.00 1.05 6.55 4.70 4.35 4.35
Avg. 3.13 2.48 2.34 2.13 3.56 2.96 2.88 3.18 11.53 9.46 8.04 6.70
L
iv
D
et
20
13 Biometrika 2.95 3.35 2.55 3.10 1.90 2.25 2.50 3.05 8.05 7.60 5.30 4.95
Italdata 1.30 0.85 0.60 5.00 1.25 1.25 1.40 1.35 26.45 20.60 19.30 12.25
Crossmatch 4.25 4.25 4.55 0.60 6.40 5.85 4.55 5.20 6.15 6.05 5.20 5.50
Swipe 2.25 2.45 1.65 1.90 3.55 4.25 3.90 3.80 11.15 9.60 7.50 6.35
Avg. 2.69 2.73 2.34 2.65 3.28 3.40 3.09 3.35 12.95 10.96 9.33 7.26
L
iv
D
et
20
15 GreenBit 1.30 1.55 1.30 1.30 3.40 2.60 2.90 2.40 10.05 8.25 8.65 7.05
Digital P. 4.95 4.90 4.90 4.75 6.55 5.57 5.60 5.20 16.75 15.75 14.25 14.10
Hi Scan 4.45 3.80 3.65 3.20 4.15 4.00 3.55 4.20 14.05 13.05 11.20 11.15
Crossmatch 4.02 3.91 3.45 3.56 5.31 5.30 4.97 4.85 12.41 12.83 9.58 10.38
Avg. 3.68 3.54 3.33 3.20 4.85 4.37 4.26 4.16 13.32 12.47 10.92 10.67
(b) Unknown-material protocol.
FV encoding Vlad encoding BoW encoding
Dataset 256 512 1024 2048 256 512 1024 2048 256 512 1024 2048
Bio11 6.33 7.05 8.33 8.33 10.05 7.83 9.05 10.05 17.98 15.50 15.05 11.83
Bio13 1.00 1.00 1.18 1.32 2.82 3.13 4.13 3.82 8.70 6.05 5.50 3.87
Ita11 4.50 3.78 6.50 7.78 16.50 19.33 21.23 19.78 31.53 27.50 21.83 18.00
Ita13 0.50 0.30 0.32 0.32 1.17 1.00 0.82 0.82 8.17 8.05 4.63 3.37
Avg. 3.08 3.03 4.08 4.44 7.64 7.83 8.85 8.61 16.60 14.28 11.75 9.28
(c) Unknown-sensor protocol.
FV encoding Vlad encoding BoW encoding
Train set - Test set 256 512 1024 2048 256 512 1024 2048 256 512 1024 2048
Bio11 - Ital11 18.00 19.10 19.90 18.50 29.90 23.80 20.10 19.30 31.90 32.30 32.92 38.80
Bio13 - Ital13 1.80 1.70 1.50 1.20 3.10 3.60 4.00 3.50 36.95 29.65 32.20 37.95
Ital11 - Bio11 11.50 9.60 9.90 10.50 20.00 17.70 16.00 15.20 32.30 36.75 32.25 39.25
Ital13 - Bio13 1.10 0.90 1.10 1.10 1.60 1.40 1.60 1.90 12.30 9.30 6.75 5.70
Avg. 8.10 7.83 8.10 7.83 12.90 11.63 10.43 9.98 28.36 27.00 26.04 30.43
(d) Cross-database protocol.
FV encoding Vlad encoding BoW encoding
Train set - Test set 256 512 1024 2048 256 512 1024 2048 256 512 1024 2048
Bio11 - Bio13 11.60 11.10 7.00 6.80 26.60 29.10 18.20 15.70 43.8 5 38.55 28.80 32.45
Bio13 - Bio11 12.50 11.20 11.60 12.70 10.20 10.50 10.60 11.10 49.50 49.90 49.80 49.85
Ital11 - Ital13 9.80 7.60 6.20 5.60 10.00 8.40 10.10 8.70 48.75 48.20 47.75 45.60
Ital13 - Ital11 26.00 19.40 13.30 11.50 26.30 27.70 22.40 18.10 49.90 49.75 49.60 49.75
Avg. 14.98 12.33 9.53 9.15 18.28 18.93 15.33 13.40 48.00 46.60 43.99 44.41
TABLE VII: Computational performance in seconds on LivDet
2015.
K 256 512 1024 2048
BoW encoding 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.39
Vlad encoding 1.24 1.33 1.58 1.98
FV encoding 1.17 1.48 2.11 3.39
is available to carefully analyse the best option, 1024 can be
chosen as a sub-optimal value for K.
D. Computational efficiency
In this last set of experiments, we study the computational
efficiency of the proposed image encodings for different pa-
rameter configurations. For this purpose, we select the LivDet
2015 database, since it contains the largest images. Table VII
shows the average performance of the proposal over different
vocabulary sizes K. As it could be expected, different K
values have an impact on the average computational efficiency
of the proposed methods, since the feature vector sizes depend
directly on K. More specifically, these efficiency results indi-
cate that higher vocabulary sizes K worsen the computational
efficiency of the PAD methods in many cases. On the other
hand, in some cases, larger K values also lead to a better
detection performance.
It should be noted that, in all cases, the efficiency values
reported by BoW encoding for each parameter combination
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are always below 400 milliseconds, while for FV encoding
they are above 1100 milliseconds. Therefore, being FV the
most accurate approach, it will be interesting to improve its
computation efficiency in future work in order to attain a
better trade-off between detection accuracy and computational
efficiency.
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